A CH-47 Chinook approaching the deck of a military support vessel at sea, with an amphibious ship, escorts, and a flight of helicopters headed toward a distant coastline

Contemporary Army Solutions to the JFC’s Seabasing Challenge

When I wrote this paper at the Naval War College in 2006, its premise required a deliberate act of imagination: that a Joint Force Commander might be denied the land bases his campaign depended on. That premise no longer requires imagination.

The paper’s finding was that the Army’s seabasing concepts could not meet the standard the joint community had set for them. The reason was not conceptual. It was arithmetic — lift ceilings, sortie counts, and fuel volumes that did not close, with every proposed solution eventually returning the force to a fixed position ashore. The recommendations that followed required no new program of record.

Originally submitted to the Naval War College’s Joint Military Operations Department, the paper is preserved here as part of my professional writing and military logistics archive.

Contemporary Army Solutions to the JFC’s Seabasing Challenge

Darren Zimmer, COL, USA

Naval War College — Joint Military Operations Department

Newport, Rhode Island — October 2006

21 pages · DTIC Accession ADA463677

Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Read the Original Paper (PDF) →

Archival source: Defense Technical Information Center, ADA463677

Looking Back — Twenty Years On

The paper assumed access to land bases might one day be denied. Since then, basing and overflight access have been withdrawn by long-standing partners over policy disagreement rather than military necessity, and a critical maritime chokepoint has been closed for an extended period. The particular relationships will change again. What does not change is that access arrangements which appear settled are contingent on political circumstances that move faster than force structure can follow.

The Pacific presents the same problem in a different form. Even where partners remain willing to provide access, the distances involved may place those bases too far from the objective to be of operational use. Willingness and utility are not the same thing. A force able to project and sustain itself from the sea is exposed to neither limitation.

What the paper found, underneath the numbers, was a competition the Army had not resolved. The same aircraft required to employ the force were required to sustain it, and committing them to one left the other unresourced. Lift, fuel, maintenance, and security drew on the same finite assets, and optimizing any one of them degraded the others. That is the problem I have argued elsewhere artificial intelligence is suited to address — not by accelerating decisions inside a single domain, but by integrating them against a common reference. The tools to model those tradeoffs did not exist when this was written.

Some would say a twenty-year-old assessment of force structure has little to offer a force built around different units and different platforms. The formations have changed. The tradeoff has not, and neither has the arithmetic that produced it.

The conditions this paper anticipated have arrived, and the question it examined is more pressing now than when it was written. What does your planning assume about access — and what happens to that plan when the assumption fails?

Similar Posts

  • Effective Leadership Practices – 10 Zimmer Principles

    10 Leadership Practices – Zimmer Principles. Successful organizations and senior leaders share a symbiotic relationship, but it’s the aspiring junior leaders that both will come to depend upon for their future successes. Cultivating junior leadership should be a key goal for organizations seeking a formative future. For consideration are ten leadership practices, or leadership principles that may prove helpful to the young, aspiring leader, and may serve as a reminder to a few old ones as well. 1 – Be You Many junior leaders select an exemplar to model themselves after by emulating their style in an attempt to achieve…

  • Being a Leader (and an Ass)

    Leadership through Tough Love? Sometimes when in a leadership position you find yourself preserving your sanity by being an Ass. I’m not sure it’s always a good thing, but sometimes it’s not bad. Soldiers come and go from platoons. On one occasion while leading a platoon in the 82d Airborne Division, we received a new soldier, fresh from truck driver and airborne schools. He was apparently a bit nervous, but also a bit cocky. This was not a bad combination, it was one the Platoon Sergeant, and I could easily deal with to integrate him effectively into the platoon. Unfortunately…

  • Tactical verses Strategic Problem Solving (example II)

    Tactical verses Strategic Problem Solving Sometimes we address Strategic Problems with Tactical solutions and wonder why they fail in the long run.  This causes us to question our decision making and problem solving processes, as it should.  This example may help orient one to consider addressing root problems rather than symptoms of the problem.  A simple example of decision making and problem solving at both the tactical and strategic levels lies with the struggle of fighting the common cold.   When one has a cold, we look for remedies or medication to minimize the pains associated with the cold –…

  • Every Organization Lies (Organizational Myths)

    Myths & Lies Organizational Myths and lies.  Every organizations lies to perpetuate itself, and it enlists the aid of those who are perpetuated by it (knowingly or unknowingly). Every organization has myths about what behavior, actions, or practices will help its members get ahead. The challenge of the aspiring young employee is to know which myths are useful and which to avoid. That’s not easy because they can be ingrained in the very culture of the organization. One such ‘big lie’ that’s been around the Army for many years is that an officer should never pass up an opportunity to…